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AN ANALYSIS THAT IS NOT "AD HOC":
THE BIFURCATED UNIFORM
ANALYSIS THAT THE FEDERAL
COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW TO
DETERMINE COMPUTER PROGRAM
COPYRIGHT NONLITERAL
INFRINGEMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last ten years,' the federal courts 2 have started to determine
the scope of protection the Copyright Act 3 grants to the components in
a computer program other than the text in which a computer program 4
1. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), is
the leading case recognizing that the literal components of the computer program are entitled to copyright protection. Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1073 (1989). Apple was also the
first to confront and reject the claim that the nonliteral components are entitled to copyright protection. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.04[C] (1992). Just ten years later however, the majority of the federal courts now recognize that the nonliteral components are entitled to copyright protection. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. Because the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988), is Federal law, the doctrine of preemption prohibits the state courts from determining the copyright infringement issues. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1521 (D. Colo. 1992).
Therefore, the federal courts, e.g., the district courts and the circuit courts of appeal, develop all the case law that arises under the Copyright Act.
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
The Copyright Act extends copyright protection to any subject matter that is listed in
the Copyright Act, e.g., literary works, musical works, dramatic works, derivative works,
etc. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-05 (1988). Subject matter protected by the Copyright Act grants the
owner of that copyrighted work the exclusive rights to reproduce copies, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies, to perform the work publicly, and to display the work
publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). In addition, the Copyright Act grants and limits other
specific rights that depend on the nature of the work, e.g., rights to attribution and integrity, fair use, licensing, etc. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-20 (1988).
Finally, the value of these rights is that they are a bundle of rights that can be sold
one at a time to different buyers and the courts will protect any one or all of the rights
from someone infringing their scope. See infra note 9 for a further discussion of the value
of copyrights.
4. A "computer program" is defined in the Copyright Act (1980) as "a set of state-
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is written. The components in a computer program can be classified
into two groups. The first group is referred to as the literal textual
component group. The textual source and object code of a computer
program define the literal components of the program. 5 The second
group is referred to as the nonliteralcomponent group.6 The nonliteral
components include every component of the program that is not a literal component, for example, the overall organizationof a program, the
structureof a program's command system, and the sequence of the presentation of information on the computer screen. Today, the majority of
the federal courts recognize that the nonliteral components of a computer program are entitled to copyright protection. 7 Consequently, now
the courts must define the scope of that protection. However, defining
the proper scope of copyright protection is proving to be a bigger challenge than at least one court could have ever anticipated.8
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
A "computer program" is commonly referred to as "software", and these two terms
are used synonymously in this comment. Pearl Systems, Inc. v. Competition Elec., Inc., 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520, 1520 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
See also infra note 19 for a further discussion of the nature of a computer program.
5. A computer programmer writer writes the textual form of the program as a set of
statements or instructions that a person can read line by line and figure out the possible
results that a program will achieve when the program is run on a computer. See Randall
Davis, The Nature of Software and Its Consequencesfor Establishingand EvaluatingSimilarity, 5 SoFTwARE L.J. 299 (1992).
6. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass. 1990).
The idea that nonliteral components exist in a copyrightable work was first created
by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
(a literary works infringement case where the court held that a theater play is copyrightable beyond the mere text of the work).
Judge Learned Hand's idea that nonliteral components exist in a work has been
adopted in the most recent computer program infringement case as follows: "[C]opyright
protection extends beyond a literary work's strictly textual form to its non-literal components.... [I]t is of course essential to any protection of literary property that the right
cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations." Computer Assocs., 982 F. 2d at 702 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d. Cir. 1930)).
7. Flowing from the recognition that the Copyright Act grants copyright protection
to computer programs, is the result that the nonliteral components of a computer program are also protected. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234
(3d. Cir. 1986).
This result is stated clearly in the leading case on computer program nonliteral infringement: "If the nonliteral structures of literary works are protected by copyright; and
if computer programs are literary works, as we are told by the literature; then the nonliteral structures of computer programs are protected by copyright." Computer Assocs., 982
F. 2d at 702.
8. Whelan was the first case to hold that the nonliteral and the literal components
of a computer program are protectable under the Copyright Act. Whelan, 797 F.2d at
1248. However, the analysis that the court developed to reach its holding was flawed, be-
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The difficulty of the scope challenge is evidenced by the federal
courts' failure to adopt a uniform analysis for determining when the
nonliteral components of one program are infringed by another program. The federal courts' failure presents two major problems. First,
the grant of copyright protection is only valuable if that grant includes
the right of enforceability in a court of law. 9 Second, without a uniform
analysis for the federal courts to follow, both computer technology and
copyright law will suffer, because: (1) computer technology growth will
be stunted since a computer program owner will not know (a) when a
program may be infringed, or (b) when a newly created program may
infringe another existing program;10 and, (2) copyright law will stagnate
because the various federal circuits will define the scope of copyright
protection differently." Thus, in order to create an enforceable copyright "right" and to avoid the problems of non-uniformity created by
"determining"' 12 the proper scope of copyright protection, the federal
courts must adopt a uniform analysis to apply in computer program
cause the court did not understand the nature of the subject matter it was protecting. See
infira notes 99-104 and the accompanying text for a criticism of the Whelan analysis.
9. In copyright law, the right of enforceability of one's copyrights arises when "anyone violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106
through 118 .. " 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988). Violation of a user's permitted use, as defined in
the Copyright Act, is termed an infringement of the copyrighted work. Id.
Section 117 of the Copyright Act defines the rights of the computer program copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988). Together, section 117 and the rights granted in section 106, require the federal courts to adopt a uniform analysis for determining copyright
nonliteral infringement, in order to grant the proper scope of protection to the nonliteral
components in a computer program. See also infra notes 10-13 and the accompanying text
discussing why a uniform analysis is necessary.
10. Computer technology grows one building block at a time. Davis, supra note 5, at
304-06. A new program cannot be expected to recreate ideas that already exist in the public domain, or else growth would occur at a rate too small to sustain the computer
software industry. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238. On the other hand, a new program cannot
merely copy the innovative expression that makes an existing program so valuable.
Thomas M. Gage, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright Protection
for Computer Software Structure--rhat'sthe Purpose?,1987 Wis. L. REv. 859, 873 (1987).
11. The law does not advance very rapidly when there are several different rules that
can be applied to similar fact patterns. Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1510-11. See also infra notes
76-82 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the different tests the courts have already created to approach the computer program copyright nonliteral infringement issue.
Furthermore, the origin of copyright law in the Constitution suggests that the rules
emanating from that single beginning should not contradict one another. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. The "determination" of copyright infringement is never achieved by simply finding the bright-line Congress drew in the Copyright Act, because Congress drew no such
line. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 73. "Congress could have constitutionally drawn defendants'
proposed bright-line--providing protection only to computer program code and not to
nonliteral elements of computer programs-but Congress has not done so....Instead, the
court must adjudicate within the area of protection mandated by Congress." Id.

488

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XII

13

copyright nonliteral infringement cases.
Throughout the development of nonliteral infringement case law,
the courts have agreed on how to resolve the initial issues in a nonliteral infringement analysis by applying the traditional literal infringement rules. 14 However, when a court must address the issues
comprising nonliteral component copyrightability' 5 and nonliteral com17
16
ponent substantial similarity, the courts' analyses are "ad hoc.'
Various courts have taken different approaches to resolve the
copyrightability and the substantial similarity issues.1 8 However, all of
13. See infra notes 128-140 and the accompanying text discussing the proposed uniform analysis the courts should adopt.
14. In a copyright infringement suit, the plaintiff must prove (I) copyright ownership
and (II) copying. 3 NimMEm, supra note 1, §§ 13.01-.03. Copyright ownership requires the
plaintiff to prove she owned a valid copyright to the program. E.F.Johnson, 623 F. Supp.
1485, 1491-92 (D. Minn. 1985). Copying requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
copied the plaintiff's program in creating his "own" program. Computer Assocs., 775 F.
Supp. at 557-58. The plaintiff can prove copying through (A) direct evidence, e.g. the defendant outright admits having copied the plaintiff's program, or through (B) indirect evidence. Id. Indirect evidence of copying requires the plaintiff to prove both (1) the
defendant had access to a copy of the plaintiff's program, and (2) the defendant illicitly
copied the plaintiff's program, that is, the quality and the quantity of the defendants
copying violate the scope of protection the Copyright Act grants to the plaintiff's program. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231-32.
In proving access and illicit copying, direct evidence is near impossible to obtain. 3
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03. Thus, the courts have developed a two prong test, termed
the substantialsimilarity test, to help the trier of fact answer both these questions. Id.
The first prong of the substantialsimilarity test is termed the "extrinsic" test. The
"extrinsic" test requires the trier of fact to "dissect" the two works in controversy and
utilize lay and expert testimony to determine whether the similarities between the two
works are (a) sufficient to prove copying, if there is some evidence of access, or (b) so
striking as to preclude the possibility that the two works were created independently, if
there is no evidence of access. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
The second prong is termed the "intrinsic"test. The "intrinsic"test is used only if
the "extrinsic" test has established copying. Id. In the "intrinsic"test, only the responses
of the lay observer are employed to determine whether the copying was illicit under the
Copyright Act. Id.
15. See infra notes 35-41 and the accompanying text discussing nonliteral component
copyrightability.
16. See infra notes 42-46 and the accompanying text discussing nonliteral component
substantial similarity.
17. The basis underlying the copyright law is that the law protects the expression of
an idea but not the idea itself. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 703 (referencing Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)). The basis appears straight forward, but, even after thirty
years of evolving several aspects of the copyright infringement analysis, Judge Learned
Hand still concluded that, "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator
has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must
therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487, 488 (2d Cir. 1960).
18. See infra notes 79-82 and the accompanying text discussing the various court de-
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the courts utilize five statutory tools to interpret the proper scope of
protection for the computer program nonliteral components: (1) the
scope of protection as it is defined by the nature of a computer program; 19 (2) the scope of protection as it is defined by prior case law;20
veloped tests employed to analyze the computer program copyright nonliteral infringement issue.
19. A basic understanding of (1) the elements of a computer and the relationships
that the elements of a computer have with each other, and (2) the role that a computer
program serves in those relationships, allows the most computer illiterate person to comprehend the nature of a computer program. See G. GERVAISE DAVIS III, ESQ., SOFTWARE
PROTECTION 8-17 (Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Ltd. 1985).
A computer traditionally contains four elements: (1) a central processing unit
(CPU)-the "thinking" part of the computer that does computations; (2) the computer's
memory--an area for storing computer programs and other information; (3) an input device to get information into the CPU for doing computations-the key board or another
device; (4) an output device-a viewing monitor, screen or a printer. Davis, supra note 5,
at 302-03.
A CPU is really just a big calculator that utilizes electronic impulses to perform various functions. The various functions that the CPU performs are determined by the computer programs that "tell" the CPU how to "think". The program knows what to tell the
CPU in a given situation because a person, called a computer programmer, wrote a set of
instructions telling the CPU what to do in certain situations. See Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
In order for the programmer to understand and devise how a program must control
the CPU, the programmer determines first the ultimate task the program will perform.
Davis, supra note 5, at 304-07. Then, the programmer breaks down the ultimate task into
sub-tasks, and sub-sub-tasks, and etc., as is necessary to utilize the basic arithmetic functions the CPU can perform. Id
The sub-tasks and sub-sub-tasks that all help perform a related function are called
components. NIMMER,supra note 1, § 13.03[F][1]. There are several components that go
into writing a computer program. Id These components categorize the ideas in the program, and the expression of an idea is the particular way the component functions to
achieve the result orientated idea. Id
For this comment, understanding the particular nature of each component is not necessary. However, understanding that the components interact with each other when the
CPU operates, is necessary. The components appear static and independent when they
are written in code on paper. In operation though, the components are very active and
they "behave". See Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 560.
To visualize how the components in a computer program "behave," think of the computer program as a recipe for baking bread. In text form, the recipe is nothing more than
instructions for combining various ingredients. In practice, the recipe is the combination
of ingredients in a bread pan in the oven. The bread in the oven is the same combination
of ingredients as the ingredients in the text form, but the actual combination actively
"behaves" unlike the words in the recipe text. Analogously, the components in the computer program actively "behave" when they are put into operation in the CPU. This "behavior" displays characteristics of the components that the text cannot describe when the
text is merely read literally in written form.
The components of the program are broken down into literal and nonliteral components. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 44-46. Since this comment is primarily concerned with
the nonliteral comments, this comment will not fully address tangential issues solely involving literal components. The heart of the computer program copyright nonliteral in-
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21
(3) the scope of protection as it is defined by economic considerations;
22
(4) the scope of protection as it is defined by the Constitution; and, (5)
the scope of protection as it is defined by the Copyright Act.23 Of these

fringement issue concerns the "behavior" of the text of the program-that is the
components of the program that are part of the text of the program but not literally written in code as such. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706. The nonliteral components
include: misbehavior, macros, data structures, file structures, data flow, control structures, flow charts, problem decomposition, and set of services. Davis, supra note 5, at 318325.
20. See infra notes 76-82 and the accompanying text discussing the tests the courts
have developed to confront this issue.
21. Two significant doctrines guide the scope of economic considerations. The first is
the natural law approach to economics that promotes the supply and demand theory with
a hands-off attitude toward governmental intervention. Menell, supra note 1, at 1059.
Second, is the United States Constitution. The Constitution specifically grants Congress
the power, "to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by Securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1060-61.
Thus, the issue becomes how much protection does the computer program owner
need in order to encourage successful development in computer technology, while at the
same time benefiting the public good. Id. at 1059. The natural law approach says that a
good product will fetch a profit and that competition will maintain a fair profit to benefit
the public good. Id. at 1060-61. The courts have interpreted the constitutional consideration in favor of promoting the public good regardless of whether that means more protection or less protection than the natural law approach dictates. Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Consequently, because of the supremacy of the
Constitution, "The ultimate aim is, by this incentive [copyright protection], to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good." Id
22. In Twentieth Century Music Corp., the Supreme Court advised courts on how to
establish the proper constitutional standard for the copyright protection of new subject
matter as follows:
[T]he copyright law seeks to establish adequate equilibrium. On the one hand it
affords protection to authors as an incentive to create, and on the other, it must
appropriately limit the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation. In applying the federal act to new types of cases, courts
must always keep this symmetry in mind.
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 696 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at
156).
23. See supra notes 2-6 and the accompanying text discussing the scope of copyright
protection the Copyright Act grants to computer subject matter.
Further defining this scope of copyright protection is the influence of the "legislative
history" behind the Copyright Act. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1240-42. The literal text of the
Copyright Act does not include the components of a computer program that the Copyright Act intends to protect. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117. Rather, the Copyright Act defines a
computer program in section 101, and then the Copyright Act discusses the scope of protection for a computer program in section 117. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 702.
The "legislative history," however, suggests that copyright protection extends beyond
the literal code of the program to include the literal and nonliteral components. I& Congress adopted as "legislative history," almost verbatim the report of the Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)-the commission appointed by
Congress to study and report on the problems and interactions between technology and
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five tools, the first tool is the most important for "determining" 24 the
proper scope of nonliteral protection, because the law cannot protect
that which it does not understand. 25
This comment first discusses two cases, setting up the background
necessary to understand why a uniform analysis is essential for determining computer program copyright nonliteral infringement. Second,
this comment explains why the tests developed by the federal courts
fail to resolve the computer program copyright nonliteral infringement
issue. Third, this comment develops the bifurcated uniform analysis the
courts should adopt to determine the proper scope of copyright protection for the nonliteral components in a computer program. Finally, this
comment demonstrates that the bifurcated uniform analysis integrates
both the practical and the theoretical aspects of copyright law. Now,
only if the courts unite and adopt the bifurcated uniform analysis, will
the computer industry be able to continue writing an "expressive"
26
future.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

THE WHELAN ASSOCIATES V. COMPUTER ASSOCIATES BATTLE

Computer program nonliteral components were first protected in
the computer program infringement case of Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory.27 Now, seven years after that decision, only five
of the thirteen federal circuits have formulated their own opinions
about this controversial decision. 28 However, not until 1992, in the case
copyright law. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241 (quoting CONTU Final Report 21 (1978)).
CONTU advised Congress that, "The separation of the idea from Form of expression...
is better realized through the courts exercising their judgement in particular cases [than
by a per se rule].... Flow charts, source codes, and object codes are works of authorship
in which copyright subsists." Id.
24. This word is used very loosely in this comment, precisely because of the illusive
nature of the nonliteral components in a computer program. See Computer Assocs., 982
F.2d at 706. A uniform analysis will not be able to decisively determine what "is" the protectable expression in a computer program, but rather, one must determine what "is not"
protectable expression in the process of determining whether there has been nonliteral
component infringement. See infra notes 67-75 and the accompanying text discussing the
exclusionary tests the courts use to define what is not protectable expression.
25. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F].
26. Only the expression of an idea is protectable. See supra note 17 discussing this
proposition. Therefore, as long as the computer industry cannot uniformly determine
what components of the computer program are protectable in court, software pirates will
continue to rob the computer industry of its profits and pirating may eventually put the
computer industry out business in the open market. See How Bad Is The Software Problem?, 5 SOFTWARE L. BULLETIN, March/April 1992, at 50.
27. CARY H. SHERMAN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION LAW § 203.7(b) (1991).

28. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248 (3d Cir. 1986); Plains Cotton Co-op Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g and reh'g en banc
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of Computer Associates Internationalv. Altai, Inc.29 did a court develop
a solid analysis to rival the Whelan analysis.3 0 By evaluating Whelan
and Computer Associates, one will understand society's need for a uniform analysis, and one will begin to see the elements that must be included in a uniform analysis.
B.

THE WHELAN ASSOCIATES CASE

In Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,31 a panel of
three circuit judges held that a computer program's nonliteral compo-

nents were copyrightable. 32 In reviewing the district court decision, the
circuit court first discussed the issue of copyrightability to determine

whether the plaintiff's computer program nonliteral components were
copyrightable subject matter within the Act. This issue invoked the
ever developing doctrine of the idea/expression dichotomy. 3 3 This dichotomy required the court to distinguish between the ideas in a comdenied (1987)(declining to adopt the Whelan analysis); Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Systems, 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989)(adopting the elements of the Whelan
analysis without referencing Whelan); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d
832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, (adopting the Computer Assocs. analysis); Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting the Whelan analysis and developing its
own analysis).
29. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
30. See Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1512-13.
31. W9helan, 797 F.2d at 1222.
Whelan Associates (Whelan) was the developer of a custom computer program,
Dentalab. Dentalab was designed for Jaslow's dental prosthetics and devices manufacturing business. Jaslow Dental Lab. (Jaslow) licensed Dentalab from Whelan. Id. at 1225.
Two years after Jaslow had been using the program, Jaslow developed its own program, Dentacom. Dentacom performed the same functions as Dentalab. No longer needing Whelan's services, Jaslow severed its relationship with Whelan. Further, Jaslow
recommended that Whelan stop marketing Dentalab because Dentalab revealed Jaslow
trade secrets. Id. at 1226.
Whelan ignored Jaslow's recommendation, sp Jaslow sued Whelan for misappropriating trade secrets. Suspecting that Jaslow had copied Dentalab, Whelan counterclaimed.
Whelan alleged that Jaslow had copied Dentalab in the making of Dentacom, and thus
Dentacom infringed Dentalab. Id at 1227-28.
The district court agreed with Whelan, and the court of appeals affirmed the district
court decision. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248.
32. The exact holding by the court represents their misunderstanding of the real nature of a computer program, "We hold that (1) copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond the programs' literal code to their structure, sequence, and
organization ..
" Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248. The holding by itself does not appear incorrect. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 708. However, the court considered the three
terms structure, sequence, and organization equivalents of each other, when in fact they
are not equivalent. Id. See also infra notes 98-104 discussing Whelan's errors.
33. The idea/expression dichotomy arises out of the "fundamental principle of copyright law that a copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of the idea."
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 703-704.
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puter program and the expression of those ideas, because only the
expression of the ideas was copyrightable.3 4 To respect this dichotomy,
the court formulated the broad rule that, "the purpose or function of a
utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not
necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of
the idea" for determining copyrightability.35 The rule "drew a line" defining the purpose or function of the program as the idea in the program, and everything else not necessary to that idea as the expression
in the program. The court next considered the opinions of computer
experts testifying about the nature of the computer programs in controversy.3s Then, as a matter of law,3 7 though acknowledging the expert
testimony, the court employed its own lay observations to define the
purpose of the plaintiff's program as, "an aid in the business operations
of a dental laboratory."-3 Finally, the court adopted the district court's
definition of the expression of the idea as the sequence, order, and
39
structure of the plaintiff's program
Next, in reviewing the district court's decision, the circuit court discussed the district court's finding of substantial similarity. The district
court, as the finder of fact, resolved the substantial similarity question. 4° The district court employed its own lay observations while also
relying on the expert testimony it had heard previously.4 1 In Whelan,
34. This principle is codified in the Copyright Act as follows: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method, of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in

which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)(1988).
35. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236. See also infra notes 98-104 and the accompanying text
discussing why this rule is over broad.

36. Furthermore, one court has even defined the standard of a computer literate lay
observer as follows: "In the context of computer programs, the 'ordinary reasonable person' with the ability to intelligently respond to computer expression is a computer

programmer." Atari, 975 F.2d at 844 (citing Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Sys.,
886 F.2d 1173, 1176 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991)).
37. The issue of copyrightability is a legal question determining the scope of copyright
protection granted by the Constitution and the Copyright Act. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp. 203, 209 (D. Mass. 1992).
38. Whelan 797 F.2d at 1238.
39. The district court found that, "The 'expression of the idea' in a software computer
program operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculat-

ing, and producing useful information either on a screen, print-out or by audio communication." Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F.Supp. 1307, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1985),
aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222.
40. The finder of fact can be either the court or the jury. See Manufacturers Tech. v.
Cam, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D. Conn. 1989). See supra note 14 discussing the twoprong substantial similarity inquiry.
41. Under the traditional bifurcated substantial similarity analysis, the finder of fact
could not rely on the expert testimony admitted for determining the scope of copyright
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the circuit court affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant's Dentacom program was substantially similar to the plaintiff's
Dentalab program. 42 Therefore, the Whelan court was led to also affirm the district court's finding of infringement of the plaintiff's program.43 The Whelan decision became the first federal circuit court of
appeals case to find computer program copyright nonliteral
infringement. 44
The Whelan analysis adopted one essential element necessary in a
uniform analysis, the new single-prong substantial similarity inquiry.
Conversely, most prior cases employed a two-prong substantial similarity inquiry. 45 However, the Whelan analysis also contained three critical mistakes, all regarding the nature of a computer program, which
destroyed any further precedential value the holding might have contained.46 One case strongly criticizing the Whelan decision is Computer
47
Associates Internationalv. Altai, Inc.
C.

THE COMPUTER ASSOCIATES CASE

In Computer Associates Internationalv. Altai, Inc., the court was
confronted with the same copyrightability task that the Whelan court
had "easily" completed by defining the idea in the infringed computer
program at issue. 48 Recognizing the inherent flaw in making a rule to
"draw a line" between an idea and the expression of the idea, the Comprotection for computer programs. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1323-33. This resulted in (1)
either the court, as trier of fact, being required to forget the expert testimony it already
heard for determining copyrightability, or (2) the lay juror being asked to make a determination of substantial similarity between two works embodying subject matter that very
few lay people understand. I& Consequently, the court "adopt[ed] a single-prong substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert testimony would be admissible" for the trier of fact to consider in this determination of substantial similarity.
Id at 1233.
42. Once the Whelan court determined that the district court's finding of copyright
protection for the Dentalab program was correct, the Whelan court was obligated to affirm the district court's finding of substantial similarity unless it was clearly erroneous,
since substantial similarity is a finding of fact. ComputerAssocs., 982 F.2d at 715.
43. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248 setting forth the standard of review applicable here.
44. See supra note 27 setting forth this proposition.
45. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 712-13.
46. See notes infra 98-104 and the accompanying text discussing the three mistakes
the Whelan court made.
47. ComputerAssocs., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
48. ComputerAssociates adopted the Whelan single-prong substantial similarity question, Id, at 713, and ComputerAssocs. also adopted the Whelan syllogism that gives nonliteral components copyright protection. Id at 702.
Computer Assocs. could adopt only these two contributions from Whelan because,
"fu]nfortunately, the simplicity that makes the [Whelan] test so attractive, also makes it
'conceptually overbroad' and descriptively inadequate." CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR,
Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
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puter Associates court declined to develop such an "easy" rule. 49
Rather, the court established an exclusionary test by defining what is
not copyrightable expression. 50 More significantly, the court then formulated a new analysis, by integrating several of the existing exclusionary tests to try and uniformly determine the computer program
51
copyright nonliteral infringement issues.
The new analysis contained three steps. The court employed these
three steps to address the issues of copyrightability and substantial similarity in a structured analysis, respecting the nature of a computer program. 52 In the first step, the court 53 subjected the infringed program to
the "abstraction" test, separating the literal components from the nonliteral components, and the various nonliteral components from each
other.54 In the second step, the court applied the "filtration" test to the
49. See Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 559-60 (discussing that the nature of a computer program makes the Whelan rule inherently flawed).
50. The court takes out of the Whelan decision that separating idea from expression
should not rely too heavily on metaphysical distinctions. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at
706. A computer program is more than just textual instructions so a proper analysis of
the nonliteral infringement issue must place enough emphasis on the practical considerations of the program, as it is both text and behavior. Id.
51. See infra notes 54-64 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the Computer
Assocs. analysis.
52. Another court has recognized the importance that determining copyrightability as
a matter of law makes in the overall determination of infringement:
While the issue of whether there has been an infringement ... is made properly
on a case-by-case basis, what typically also occurs in the case law analysis is that
the determination of what is protectable ... is also undertaken on a case-by-case
basis, often with little attention given to the distinction between determining
what is protected and what is an infringement.
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1510 (D. Colo. 1992).
53. The first two steps in this analysis involve the issue of copyrightability. Therefore, the court as a matter of law should resolve this issue. See notes 4 and 54 setting
forth this proposition.
54. Computer Assocs. adopts the Nichols abstraction test, but Computer Assocs. molds
it to "fit" the nature of a computer program:
As an anatomical guide to this procedure the following description is helpful: At
the lowest level of abstraction, a computer program may be thought of in its entirety as a set of individual instructions organized into a hierarchy of modules.
At a higher level of abstraction, the instructions in the lowest level modules may
be replaced conceptually by the functions of those modules. At progressively
higher levels of abstraction, the functions of higher level modules conceptually
replace the implementations of those modules in terms of lower level modules
and instructions, until finally, one is left with nothing but the ultimate function
A program has structure at every level of abstraction at
of the program ....
which it is viewed. At low levels of abstraction, a program's structure may be
quite complex; at the highest level it is trivial.
ComputerAssocs. 982 F.2d at 707. (quoting Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process,or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of
Computer Programs,88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 897-98 (1990)).
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allegedly infringed program, as follows:55 First, the court defined a
non-copyrightable component to be one that fits the definition of an exclusionary test.5 Second, the court eliminated from this infringement
analysis all the non-copyrightable components, because only copyrightable components of the plaintiff's program can be infringed.5 7 In the
third step of the new analysis, the court gathered the remaining compo59
58
comThen, the finder of fact
nents, the copyrightable components.

pared the copyrightable components in the allegedly infringed program
with the similar components in the allegedly infringing program.60 Finally, the court determined that the district court's finding of no substantial similarity between the two programs was not clearly
erroneous. 6' Thus, the court was obligated to affirm the district court's
denial of relief to the plaintiff. 62 Furthermore, the court commented
that, "so long as the appropriated material consists of non-protectable
63
expression, this result is neither unfair nor unfortunate.1
55. See generally 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F] discussing the filtration procedure.
The filtration procedure is applied to the infringed work and not the infringing work,
for two reasons. First, because, whether there exist copyrightable components in the infringing work is irrelevant to whether the defendant's program infringes on the plaintiff's
copyrightable components. Thus, the filtration of the defendant's program "would be
wasteful and unnecessarily time consuming." Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714. Second,
"[B]y focusing the analysis on the infringing rather than on the infringed material, a court
may mistakenly place too little emphasis on a quantitatively small misappropriation
which is, in reality, a qualitatively vital aspect of the plaintiff's protectable expression."
Id,
56. See infra notes 67-75 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the exclusionary tests.
57. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F][5].
58. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
59. The finder of fact may be either the court or the jury when answering the substantial similarity question. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233. In either case, the standard for
comparison should utilize both lay and expert testimony. Id. Furthermore, this rule is
consistent with the federal rule of evidence that states, "If [expert testimony] will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness...
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
60. The substantial similarity question proceeded as follows:
At this point, the court's substantial similarity inquiry focuses on whether the defendant copied any aspect of this protected expression [relying on lay and expert
testimony], as well as an assessment of the copied portions relative importance
with respect to the plaintiff's overall program [with the emphasis on the quality
not just the quantity of copying from the plaintiff's program].
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
61. Id. at 715.
62. "Determinations of credibility and the relative weight to be given expert witnesses are, of course, left primarily to the discretion of the district court." Whelan, 797
F.2d at 1246.
63. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 721.
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ANALYSIS

A. MOVING TOWARDS A UNIFORM ANALYSIS
Throughout the history of copyright nonliteral infringement cases,
the federal courts have utilized two groups of tests to help them resolve
the nonliteral infringement issues. Separately, these tests have failed to
resolve the computer program copyright nonliteral infringement issues. 64 United, however, these tests significantly define the substance
of a uniform analysis. 65 Thus, a uniform analysis based on these tests
will be an analysis that properly "determines" the scope of copyright
protection granted to the nonliteral components in a computer program.
The first group of tests are called the exclusionary tests. The
courts never intended for these tests to stand on their own to create a
uniform analysis for copyright infringement analyses. 6 6 Rather, these
tests are elements to be used in determining subject matter copyrightability. 67 These tests are divided into two sub-groups depending on
their origin in copyright law. The first sub-group includes the exclusionary doctrines that have developed from the general case history of
copyright law.68 These doctrines are grounded in the fundamental principles of copyright law as interpreted from the Constitution.69 The
70
three most significant exclusionary doctrines are the merger doctrine,
64. See infra notes 124-127 and the accompanying text discussing the short comings of
these tests.
65. See infra notes 135-136 and the accompanying text discussing the role these tests
play in the bifurcated uniform analysis.
See also 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, §§ 13.03[A]-[F] for a general discussion of these tests.
66. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 839.
67. These tests are applied by the court during the filtration step of the copyrightability question. See notes and the accompanying text discussing these tests application in
the proposed uniform analysis.
68. J.L. KUTrrEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 2.01[4] (Clark Boardman Co. 1990).
69. These doctrines are built on the Constitutional text, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,
granting federal copyright protection. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, §§ 1.01, 1.02. They have
been developed, beginning with the first copyright statute of the United States enacted by
the First Congress in 1870, throughout the most recent revision in 1976. See KUTTEN,
supra note 69, § 2.01[4]. These tests continue to expound the most fundamental principle
in copyright law - promoting the Art and Sciences for the benefit of society. Twentieth
Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156.
70. Because ideas are not always separable from their expression, the merger doctrine exists to "give the benefit of the doubt" to protecting the public and thus prohibits
the Copyright Act from protecting ideas that may be so close to their expression as to be
effectively inseparable. "[W]hen the 'idea' and its expression are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations
imposed by the patent law." Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1517 (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
In relation to computer program components, the test for merger of idea and expres-

498

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XII

the scenes a faire doctrine, 71 and the public domain doctrine. 72 The second sub-group includes the exclusionary rules that have developed from
the text of the current copyright statute.73 The courts apply these two
sub-groups of tests in each case involving copyrightable subject matter
issues because these tests define the basic scope of copyright
74
protection.
The second group of tests are called the court-developed tests. The
courts develop these tests to stand on their own as a uniform analysis
for determining computer program copyright nonliteral infringement;
specifically, the substantial similarity inquiry. 75 The courts derive these
tests from the Copyright Act by paying particular attention to interpreting copyright law in light of the nature of a computer program. 76 The
court-developed tests do not yet carry the legal significance that the exclusionary tests do because these tests are relatively new and do not yet
77
reflect the view of the majority of the courts.
Copyright case law recognizes the following four court-developed
sion is whether the use of a particular component is the only, or one of a few, means to
efficiently implement a particular idea in the program. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 708.
71. The doctrine of scenes a faire prohibits copyright protection of expression that
naturally follows from the author's work, without the author having intended to create
that expression. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
In relation to computer program components, this doctrine includes the external considerations that limit the number of efficient ways a program can be designed to perform
a particular task on a particular computer. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 709-10. These
external considerations include: CPU standards, program standards, manufacturing standards, target industry practices, and computer industry programming practices. 3 NIMMER, sup'ra note 1, § 13.03[F][3].
72. Material that is in the public domain is free for everyone to use equally. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
In the computer program context, allowing program owners to copyright program
components already existing for public use cannot be protected because the owner did not
create this material with the Constitutional minimum of creativity in "their [own] respective writings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Furthermore, such a grant of copyright protection would offend both the constitutional text as well as the constitutional concept to promote the public good through computer technology. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F][4].
73. The current copyright statute is the 1988 Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1988). In the Act, sections 107 - 120 list the exclusionary rules that apply either to all
copyrightable subject matter, e.g., independent creation, fair use, etc., or to particular subject matter, e.g., literary works, musical works, computer programs, etc.. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107120 (1988).
74. See generally Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992) (utilizing the filtration step to separate protectable computer program components away from unprotectable ones).
75. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A]. See also infra notes 83-123 and the accompanying text discussing these court developed tests.
76. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
77. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am. Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1510 (D. Colo. 1992).
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tests. The first test is the E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. "iterative"
test.78 The second test is the Whelan "structure, sequence, and organization" test.79 The third test is the Broderbund Software v. Unison
World "total concept and feel" test.8 0 Finally, the fourth test is the
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. "abstraction" test, applied in the most
recent case on this issue, Computer Associates International v. Altai,
Inc.8 1 Although the court-developed tests were intended to stand on
their own and answer the substantial similarity question, these tests
have failed to fulfill that role in copyright law.
B.
1.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE COURT DEVELOPED TESTS

The "Iterative"Test

The first computer program case to develop a nonliteral infringement test was E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp.8 2 Essentially, the court
developed a two-part "iterative" analysis.8 3 The court restated the firstprong of the traditional substantial similarity question in terms of
whether the defendant "used" the plaintiff's program to develop his
own.84 Then, the court defined a new test to replace the second-prong
of the traditional substantial similarity question. The new test asked
whether the defendant's program was an iterative reproduction of the
plaintiff's program, "that is, one produced by iterative or exact duplication of substantial portions of the copyrighted work."8 5
Although E.F Johnson contributes one positive element toward a
uniform analysis, its focus on utilizing expert testimony in the second
part of the iterative analysis, the court fails to resolve three other
problems. First, the "use" standard the court applies, in the first part of
78. E.F Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
79. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986).
80. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
81. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706-07.
82. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03 [A][1][d].
83. The following two-part analysis was developed to confront the computer program
copyright nonliteral infringement issue:
The iterative approach requires proof (1) that the defendant "used" the copyrighted work in preparing the alleged copy, which may be established by proof of
access and similarity sufficient to reasonably infer use of the copyrighted work;
and (2) that the defendant's work is an iterative reproduction, that is, one produced by iterative or exact duplication of substantial portions of the copyrighted
work.
E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
84. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A][1][d].
85. In the second part of the iterative test, the focus is on the court's evaluation of
whether similarities are illicit. See supra note 14 discussing illicit copying. Thus, the
court should utilize its own lay opinion, in conjunction with expert opinion to determine
whether the quality and the quantity of similarities suggest the defendant unlawfully copied the plaintiff's program. E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
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the iterative analysis, relies on some degree of similarity to prove copying by access,8 6 but the court does not explain how much similarity is

necessary.8 7 Second, the iterative reproduction test also fails to explain
what level of similarity is necessary for a finding of infringement, other
than in the cases of exact duplication8 8 or iterative duplication. The
court never explains what is iterative duplication.8 9 However, one could
presume it means the defendant blatantly copies components of the
plaintiff's program that no longer serve any function in the working
program.' Third, even if the defendant did "use" the plaintiff's program, i.e., if the defendant only took ideas from the plaintiff's work,
then there is no infringement since infringement requires illicit
91
copying.
2.

The "Structure,Sequence, and Organization" Test

Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory made the first
"good" attempt to develop a uniform analysis for confronting the computer program copyright nonliteral infringement issue. 92 The court addressed the idea/expression problem 93 head-on by defining what is an
idea. 94 Then, it applied this definition to any plaintiff's program to dis86. Access can be proven by showing that the allegedly infringed program was for
sale on the open market, and that plaintiff could have purchased a copy of the program.
Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 558.
87. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A][1][d].
88. In other words literal copying, which would lead a court to apply the traditional
literal infringement analysis. See supra note 14 discussing the literal infringement
analysis.
89. E.F Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493-96.
90. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A][1][d].
As a program is revised and updated, often components no longer serve a working
function in the program. However, a programmer may leave these components in the
text of the program, because they do not harm the program either. Usually, an illicit copier will not figure out that these components serve no function and thus verbatim copying
of these useless components suggests illicit copying. Davis, supra note 5, at 318-19.
91. Professor Nimmer defines the place the filtration step should be utilized in the
nonliteral infringement analysis based on the premise that only copyrightable expression
is protectable: "Infringement is shown by a substantial similarity of protectable expression, not just an overall similarity between the works. Thus, before evaluating substantial
similarity, it is necessary to eliminate from consideration those elements of a program
that are not protected by copyright." See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F].
92. See supra notes 50-52 discussing the elements in Computer Assocs., adopted from
the Whelan analysis.
93. See supra note 35 discussing the idea/expression dichotomy.
94. "[T]he function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything
that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236. See also supra notes 31-64 and the accompanying text
discussing Whelan.
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95
tinguish the expression from the idea in a component. Consequently,
since the expression is the protectable part of the component, this protectable part could then "easily" be compared to the similar expression
in the defendant's program. 96 Finally, the court, as finder of fact, would
utilize expert testimony to determine if there was enough similarity to
97

rise to the level of illicit copying.

Unfortunately, the Whelan court made three mistakes in its analysis, all stemming from the court's misunderstanding of computer technology. First, flowing directly from the definition distinguishing idea
from expression, is the broad conclusion that all that is not idea, is the
expression of an idea.98 This conclusion is inherently flawed because of
the nature of a computer program as a combination of ideas, expression,
and a mixture of ideas and expression." Second, the court used the
terms, "structure, sequence, and organization" interchangeably in their
10 0
analysis, where all three words were understood to be synonymous.
The problem with this view is that technically these terms are not synonymous. 10 1 Technically, the structure defines the internal ordering
of the components source and object code; the organization defines the
static relationships between the components in a program and the ordering of the components as a whole; and, the sequence defines the active organizational relationships, the "behavior," between the
components when the computer program is in operation. 10 2 Furthermore, an infringement test finding these three terms equivalent is fundamentally flawed because the test does not understand the subject
95. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175.
96. See notes 98-104 and the accompanying text discussing why this task is not so
"easy."
See also ikfra notes 101-102 and the accompanying text discussing the inherent flaws
in the Whelan rule.
97. The Whelan court adopted the E.F. Johnson single-prong substantial similarity
test, whereby the court utilized expert testimony in making both determinations of copying by access and illicit copying. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232-33.
98. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F].
99. A computer program's ultimate function or purpose is the composite result of interacting components, where each component may be purely an idea or the mixture of
idea and expression. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 705.
100. In the opening paragraph of its decision, the court dropped footnote one: "We use
the terms 'structure,' 'sequence,' and 'organization' interchangeably when referring to
computer programs, and we intend them to be synonymous in this opinion." Whelan, 797
F.2d at 1224 n.1.
101. The nature of a computer program requires that these terms be defined differently, because a program is both text and behavior: "[I]t is a fact that there is no necessary relationship between the sequence of operations in a program, which are part of
behavior, and the order or sequence in which those operations are set forth in the text of
the program-the source code and object code." Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 559. See
also note 19 discussing the nature of a computer program.
102. See supra note 101 supporting this explanation.
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matter it claims to protect.' 0 3 Third, the Whelan decision failed to recognize that programs may have more that one idea. 10 4 In fact, computer
programs are based on numerous ideas that interplay with each other at
the various levels the program operates. 10 5 If Whelan has taught the
legal community anything new, it is that a copyright nonliteral infringement analysis cannot include a bright-line test to distinguish ideas from
expression. Rather, the analysis must begin by recognizing the multidependent component nature of a computer program, and build on that
premise.
3.

The "Total Concept And Feel" Test

The "total concept and feel" test originated outside the computer
world.10 6 This test was first adopted in a computer program context in
the case of Broderbund Software v. Unison World. 0 7 The court utilized the total concept and feel test to help the ordinary lay observer
determine the second prong of the traditional substantial similarity
question, the intrinsic test. 0 8 The court articulated the intrinsic test as
follows: "[T]he finder of fact . . .is to determine whether an 'ordinary

reasonable person' would find the expression of the subject works to be
substantially similar. The question is whether the infringing work captures the 'total concept and feel' of the protected work." Then, the
court as finder of fact, found substantial similarity and thus infringement, because, "[t]he ordinary observer could hardly avoid being struck
by the eerie resemblance,"' 1 9 between the two programs.
The Broderbund test fails to provide a uniform analysis to the copyright nonliteral infringement issue, for two reasons. First, by employing the "total concept and feel" test to answer the second prong of the
substantial similarity question, the intrinsic test, the court violates the
fundamental principle of copyright law, which is, ideas are not copyrightable. 110 The "total concept and feel" test more closely defines an
idea in a work than the expression of the idea. The "total concept and
feel" test was first developed in a pictorial works case involving the
copyright infringement of greeting cards."'
In the pictorial works context, the whole work can be viewed and
103. Davis, supra note 5, at 314.
104. ComputerAssocs., 982 F.2d at 705.
105. ComputerAssocs., 775 F. Supp. at 559-60.
106. EF.Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1492-93 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
107. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A][1][c].
108. Broderbund,648 F. Supp. at 1137.
109. Id.
110. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A][1][c].
111. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
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understood in a single glance.1 12 The "result" of a pictorial work,
viewed by a lay observer, is the work's expression. On the other hand,
the expression in a computer program is the way a program achieves a
particular result or purpose, not the actual result itself, which is usually
an idea.1 1 3 A lay observer often does not understand the nature of a
computer program, let alone be able to distinguish between the ideas
and the expression of a program. Therefore, when a lay observer is
asked to determine the similarity between two programs based on the
total concept and feel, the observer can only compare what she understands-that is the result or the purpose of the programs, the ideas.'1 4
Thus, the "total concept and feel" test wrongly encourages the lay observer to determine similarity between programs, as based on the ideas
the programs contain, when the lay observer should be basing similarity
on the expression of the ideas as the proper subject matter of copyright
115
protection.
Second, this test loses all context when dealing with complex subject matter, such as computer programs." 6 The only way the "total
concept and feel" test may be justified is if it is limited to a class of "ordinary observers" that understand the computer subject matter in controversy. 117 However, since highly computer literate individuals are not
yet a majority of society, common sense dictates that the first prong of
the substantial similarity question, the extrinsic test, should determine
the substantial similarity question."18
4.

The "Abstraction" Test

Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc., is the first computer program copyright nonliteral infringement case to formally adopt
the abstraction test in a program infringement analysis."19 Applying
112. See ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIEs 429-30 (3d ed. 1989).
113. Id
114. Id.
115. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A][1][c].
116. "The phrase is geared towards simplistic works that require only a highly 'intrinsic' (i.e., unanalytic) evaluation; It serves no purpose in the realm of computers where analytic dissection and expert testimony emphatically are needed." 3 NIMMER, supra note 1,

§ 13.03[A][1][c].
117. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1176, n.4.
118. Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1513-14.
119. Looking at several of the computer program copyright infringement cases, one
discovers that almost every decision

employs some type of an abstraction analysis,

although the court may not formally use the term. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F].
Computer programs require at least minimal dissection because of the multi-dependent elements in a computer program, as text, and in a computer program, as behavior,
when the computer program operates in the computer. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65. See also

Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242-46 (referencing Judge Learned Hand's abstraction test when de-

504

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XII

the "abstraction" test, 120 the Computer Associates court derived the
nonliteral components in a computer program from the allegedly infringed program. 12 1 Accepting the premise that no bright-line can be
found to formulate a general rule distinguishing idea from expression,122 the court molded the abstraction test to "fit" a computer
123
program.
In itself, the utility of the abstraction test ends here.124 The abstraction test does not directly help the finder of fact determine the
nonliteral infringement issues, although it does aid the finder of fact in
this task.125 The creator of the test, Judge Learned Hand, even found
that after applying the abstraction test, the infringement analysis becomes "ad hoc.' 126 Furthermore, the infringement analysis involves
more than a determination of copyrightability, it also involves the determination of substantial similarity.127 Consequently, the abstraction
termining the idea/expression dichotomy); E.F.Johnson,623 F. Supp. at 1493-96 (applying
the iterative test component by component).
120. Here is the original "abstraction" test as Judge Learned Hand applied it to a theater play:
[Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps
be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
121. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706-07. See supra note 54 and the accompanying
text setting forth exactly how this court applied the abstraction test to the allegedly infringed program.
122. Id. at 704 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960)).
123. The court did not have to evolve the abstraction too much because a computer
program is developed in levels, as is a theater play for which the "abstraction" test was
originally developed. Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1512-13.
Furthermore, a computer program is designed in a "top down" fashion. "Top down"
means that the programmer starts with the end purpose or function that she wants a computer program to reach, e.g., adding two numbers, or word processing. Then she designs a
flow chart, beginning at the top with the purpose or function to be reached by the program, and then breaking down the purpose into sub-purposes and sub-sub-purposes that
will help fulfill the end purpose. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F][1].
Thus, starting with the most basic program function, e.g., a word processing program,
or a spread sheet program, the programmer designs "down" to the most complex level,
e.g., the electronic impulses that the CPU works with in its memory. Id.
124. Id,
125. See infra note 132 and the accompanying text discussing the utility of the abstraction test.
126. Peter Pan Fabrics,274 F.2d at 489.
127. See infra notes 129-140 and the accompanying text discussing all the elements
necessary in a uniform analysis.
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test gives the court no guidance in determining how much similarity
should constitute substantial similarity, so the abstraction test cannot be
128
its own uniform analysis.
5.

What Do These Tests Mean?

First, the "abstraction" test breaks down the complex computer
program into components that an analysis can more readily utilize to
answer the copyrightability and the substantial similarity issues. Second, the "structure, sequence, and organization" test directs the analysis
away from drawing a bright-line between idea and expression because
of the "behavioral" nature of a computer program. Third, the exclusionary doctrines and rules provide a basis in copyright law from which
copyrightable expression can be separated from uncopyrightable expression and ideas, without relying on a bright-line test. Fourth, the "iterative" test suggests utilizing a single-prong substantial similarity
question, comprising of only the extrinsic test. Finally, the "total concept and feel" test supports utilizing a single-prong substantial similarity question because of the technical complexities encountered in the
field of computer programming. Consequently, despite the positive elements that these tests do contribute to a uniform analysis, no single test
provides uniform guidance for determining how similar is substantially
similar.1 2 9 Fortunately, this conclusion does not mean that a uniform
analysis cannot provide for a more certain determination of the substantial similarity question than currently exists in the individual court de130
veloped tests.
Upon compiling the elements from all the exclusionary tests, one is
led to two conclusions. First, the issue of computer program copyright
nonliteral component copyrightability can be answered almost conclusively on any set of facts.1 3 ' Second, the issue of computer program
copyright nonliteral component substantial similarity can be answered
with a fair degree of conclusiveness, though not near the degree of con132
clusiveness as in the copyrightability issue.
128. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[A].
129. First, the exclusionary tests were never intended to provide the court with a uniform analysis of this issue. See supra note 67.
Second, the prior analysis of the deficiencies in the court developed tests demonstrates that these tests will not properly resolve this issue. See supra notes 76-127 and the
accompanying text supporting this proposition.
130. See infra note 142 supporting this proposition.
131. The abstraction step and the filtration step determine the copyrightability of components. See Lotus, 799 F. Supp. at 215-16. "Once the program's abstraction levels have
been discovered, the [copyrightability] inquiry moves from the conceptual to the con-

crete." ComputerAssocs., 982 F.2d at 707.
132. See notes 126, 142 supporting this proposition.
Furthermore, although much of the uncertainty can be eliminated by a uniform anal-
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C. THE BIFURCATED UNIFORM ANALYSIS
Just as there must be an idea before there can be an expression of
the idea, the courts must "define" computer program copyrightable expression before they can determine if there has been an infringement of
that expression. Thus, after a court determines that the owner of the
allegedly infringed program has a valid copyright, 133 the court and then
the trier of fact will make the following two additional determinations.
First, a court must determine whether the nonliteral components in the
allegedly infringed program are copyrightable. Second, the finder of
fact must determine whether similar components in the two programs
are so similar to each other that they are substantially similar.
1.

Finding The Copyrightable Components

To "answer" the question of copyrightability, the court must use
the following two step process: (1) the court must determine and understand the "abstract" components of the allegedly infringed program;
and (2) the court must "filter" out any unprotectable components. In
this two step analysis, copyrightability is a question of law. 134 However,
the court should utilize expert testimony in conjunction with its own
135
lay perspective.
a.

The Abstraction Step

The first step in the copyrightability inquiry is "abstraction." This
step employs the "abstraction" test originally developed by Judge
Learned Hand.136 This step is the best starting point for a uniform
137
analysis because of the utilitarian nature of a computer program.
Utilizing expert testimony that explains what went into the making of
the allegedly infringed program, the court defines the various levels of
nonliteral components in the allegedly infringed program. 38 These
components will contain ideas, expression of ideas, and a mixture of
39
both.1
ysis, some uncertainty will remain because of the fact based nature of the substantial similarity question. See Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1510.
133. See supra note 33 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the initial steps in
the literal infringement analysis.
134. See supra note 39 supporting this proposition.
135. See supra note 38, where Whelan strongly advances this position.
136. See supra note 56, where ComputerAssocs. adapts Judge Learned Hand's abstraction test to "fit" computer programs.
137. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F].
138. See supra notes 55-56 and the accompanying text supporting this proposition.
139. See supra note 99 and the accompanying text.
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b.

The FiltrationStep

The second step in the copyrightabiity inquiry is "filtration." Sifting through the levels of abstraction, the court filters away unprotectable expression from protectable expression, utilizing the plethora of
exclusionary tests recognized in copyright law. 140 After filtration, the
court will be left with a kernel of protectable expression. 141
2.

Determining Whether Similarity Is Substantial

To "answer" the question of substantial similarity, the finder of fact
must follow three steps. First, the trier of fact must admit as evidence
expert testimony discussing the degree of similarity between the kernel
of components in the allegedly infringed program and the components
in the allegedly infringing program. 142 Second, the finder of fact must
evaluate the credibility of the expert testimony.143 Third, weighing the
credible expert testimony, if the finder of fact determines there is similarity such that a computer literate person can conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the infringer copied the allegedly infringed
program, then the alleged infringer has illegally infringed the copied
program.144 Consequently, the infringed program owner is entitled to
collect infringement damages as dictated by the Copyright Act. 45
D.

EVALUATING THE BIFURCATED UNIFORM ANALYSIS

A bifurcated uniform analysis is supported in copyright law both
practically and theoretically. Applying the bifurcated uniform analysis
to a computer program demonstrates the certainty in determining the
copyrightability of the nonliteral components for two reasons. First, the
abstraction step and the filtration step are objective tests that any computer expert, with the aid of legal counsel in copyright law, can determine almost conclusively, without the aid of the courts.1 46 Second,
when a case does go to trial, the bifurcated uniform analysis eliminates
140. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d 707-10. See supra notes 67-75 and the accompanying
text discussing these tests.
141. This kernel represents the only protectable components in the allegedly infringed
work that will be compared to similar components in the allegedly infringing program for
the trier of fact to determine if they are substantially similar. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 13.03[F][5].
142. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232.
143. Id. at 1246.
144. Davis, supra note 5, at 325.
145. See supra note 9 discussing the grant of copyright protection.
146. Furthermore, experts can apply the proposed uniform analysis before litigation
begins so the parties can more accurately determine how the case should come out if it
does in fact go to trial. Thus, more often than not, the losing party will settle the suit to
avoid large legal fees and a unfavorable judgment. Davis, supra note 5, at 325.

508

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XII

much uncertainty from the substantial similarity question in the analysis because computer literate experts determine the degree of similarity
between the program components at issue, rather than computer illiterate judges and juries. 147 In addition to the practical benefits of the bifurcated uniform analysis, the five statutory tools also support the
148
bifurcated uniform analysis.
1.

The First Tool

The scope of protection as it is defined by the nature of a computer
program supports the bifurcated uniform analysis for three reasons.
First, the abstraction step properly dissects the computer program in accord with the way a program is created-level by level. 149 Second, the
filtration step utilizes the plethora of exclusionary tests and avoids creating a bright-line test that can only inaccurately describe a computer
program.1 50 Third, an expert can best "determine" the substantial similarity issue. An expert in computer programming understands the nature of a computer program. Thus, an expert will make a proper
similarity "determination" based on the behavioral nature of the programs at issue, rather than on the "ad hoc" understanding of the lay
151
court or jury.
2.

The Second Tool

The scope of protection as it is defined by prior case law also provides support for the bifurcated uniform analysis in the following three
ways. First, the abstraction step is deeply rooted in the doctrines of
copyright case law.' 5 2 Second, the filtration step provides the court
with tests which have already been developed by prior courts and are
thus widely utilized in copyright law.153 Third, case law has supported
the use of expert opinion and lay opinion ever since their paired intro147. The reasoning for this conclusion is as follows. First, the uniform analysis minimizes the amount of information a court may subject to the substantial similarity question
in the uniform analysis, i.e., the filtration step. Second, the uniform analysis determines
substantial similarity between similar components on the basis of expert testimony. Id.
Therefore, a smaller body of similar components are evaluated by computer literate persons, which significantly reduces the chance that similar components will be evaluated on

an irrelevant basis. Id
148. See notes 19-25 and the accompanying text for the discussion of the statutory interpretation tools.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706-07.
See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F].
Davis, supra note 5, at 325.
This test originated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d

Cir. 1930), and the test has continued to be adopted through the case of ComputerAssocs.,

982 F.2d at 706.
153. Thus, future courts can look back on these decisions to help them apply the test
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duction in Arnstein v. Porter.154 More significantly, recent case law emphasizes the value in primarily using expert testimony when
determining the substantial similarity question. 155
3.

The Third Tool

The scope of protection as it is defined by economic considerations
further supports the bifurcated uniform analysis for two reasons. First,
the abstraction step and the filtration step can both be performed by
each party to a potential law-suit before the case goes to trial, thus, reducing legal costs due to court time and lawyer fees. 156 Second, by
utilizing expert testimony, the courts and the parties will not have to
waste time and money teaching the finder of fact the intricacies of a
57
computer program.1
4.

The Fourth And Fifth Tools

The scope of protection, as it is defined by the Constitution and the
Act, provides additional support for the bifurcated uniform analysis for
three reasons. First, the filtration step is based on the doctrines of
copyright law that evolve from the Constitution. 158 Second, the filtration step is also based on the rules in the Copyright Act, so again federal law requires that these tests be applied. 159 Third, the abstraction
step and the substantial similarity question do not directly gain support
from the Constitution or the Copyright Act. However, since these steps
aid the fact finder in the determination of the nonliteral infringement
issue, the fourth and the fifth tools indirectly support the bifurcated
160
uniform analysis.
in the computer context. See supra notes 69-75 and the accompanying text discussing the
exclusionary tests.
154. Arnstein, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
155. The Arnstein two-prong test is well-suited for evaluating works that are readily
comprehensible to the lay observer. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 713. However, in the
case of computer programs, which are rather impenetrable to judges and juries, the Amstein test must be set aside in favor of the single-prong substantial similarity question,
which utilizes expert testimony. I&.
156. Thus, the court does not have to waste time developing these tests from scratch.
Also, each party will know how to better prepare their case, and may even find it more
cost efficient to settle the case. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1058.
Furthermore, parties can now dissect their own programs and apply the exclusionary
tests to determine if their program contains any copyrightable components, or if they
have copied any copyrightable components from another program. See Davis, supra note
5, at 325.
157. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[F].
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. (How much more support can a legal analysis get
than being partly rooted in the Constitution!)
159. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 711.
160. First, the ultimate aim of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
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CONCLUSION

The difficulties that Computer Associates encountered in the Whe-

lan decision arose because the Whelan court lacked a basic understanding of computer programs. The analysis that Computer Associates
developed was much improved over Whelan because the Computer Associates court laid down a structured analysis incorporating a better understanding of the computer program. However, Computer Associates
did not advocate strongly enough the bifurcated need that a uniform
analysis would necessarily have to serve in order to properly protect the
nonliteral subject matter that a computer program embodies.
The bifurcated uniform analysis clearly recognizes this "bifurcated"
need. Building on the Computer Associates computer literate decision,
the bifurcated -uniform analysis integrates the traditional literal infringement steps, and then, the analysis develops the bifurcated inquiry,
first into the copyrightability issues, and second, into the substantiality
similarity issues. The bifurcated emphasis makes the bifurcated uniform analysis universally applicable to specifically protecting computer
programs nonliteral components. Thus, the bifurcated uniform analysis
significantly diminishes the "ad hoc" results the courts have produced
through applying the existing analyses in computer program copyright
nonliteral infringement cases.
In practice, the bifurcated uniform analysis determines the proper
scope of copyright protection for the computer program nonliteral components. More significantly, the statutory tools support adopting the bifurcated uniform analysis. In conclusion, both the courts and the
computer industry will benefit from adopting the bifurcated uniform
analysis. The bifurcated uniform analysis will produce court opinions
that understand, through expert assistance, the subject matter being
protected. Thus, the court's decisions will be uniformly computer-literate for those in the legal profession and the computer programming
field to follow.
Michael J. Bendel
general public good." Twentieth Century Music, 422 U.S. at 156. Second, the proposed
analysis will uniformly protect program expression, thus promoting program creativity,
i.e., the creation of programs. See supra notes 126-127. Therefore, the Constitution and
the Copyright Act support the uniform analysis because it furthers the "ultimate" aim of
copyright law.

